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Along with economic globalization and scientific and technological development, 
the enterprise's business environment has undergone profound changes. Competitions 
among enterprises have changed from purely competition to the competition also with 
cooperative, enterprise relations of cooperation is increasingly becoming a hot issue in 
enterprise management. Supply Chain Alliance as an effective cooperation between 
enterprises can make independent of each enterprises to achieve some common goals 
with the Union of their core competencies of respective strengths and areas, and 
overall and individual enterprises can have a profit. However, due to the existence of 
asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard problem caused by 
principal-agent become a threat to the cooperation between enterprises in the supply 
chain, and therefore studying how to eliminate and reduce the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problem in supply chain between enterprises is necessary. At the same 
time, these studies also have certain significance for Chinese enterprises to change 
their management philosophy and management style, and to adapt to the international 
business strategy, improving the survival and competitiveness. 
On the base of the analysis of the causes of the supply chain, we have a study on 
principal-agent mechanism between enterprises in supply chain, which leads to the 
principal-agent problem, namely adverse selection and moral hazard problems. After 
the analysis of the dangers of adverse selection and moral hazard to the enterprises, 
through modeling shows that in the basic premise of information asymmetry 
conditions, signal transduction and signal through screening can solve the problem of 
adverse selection, but the agents in order to show their type, they have to pay more 
cost and effort. In order to solve the problem of moral hazard, the client must inspire 
the agents, and agents of risks with agents. 
In the last part, we analyze the adverse selection and moral hazard problem, and 
pointed out that Chinese enterprise’s cooperation in supply chain have its own 
characteristics. We use the conclusion of the last part to analyze the supply chain and 
corporations between Enterprises in China's supply chain and draw the conclusion to 
the problem. 
We have research on the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems at the same time, and can provide a theoretical basis to enterprises in the 
supply chain enterprises on how to resolve the problem. Moreover, this analysis of the 
domestic supply chain enterprises in a number of questions put forward some 
recommendations for improvement, there is certain practical significance. It also 
needs to continue to study the direction of multi-tasking and multi-agent problem. 
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